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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MINERSVILLE LAND AND 
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
EARL P. STATEN, Administrator of 
the Estate of William Story, Jr., de-
ceased, W I L L I A M MacARTHUR 
STORY, MARION S. G 0 E L T Z, 
FLORENCE M. STORY HAINES, 
ELEANOR STORY N 0 WE L S, 
FRANK PRYOR, Administrator of Case No. 8662 
the Estate of Frederick Steigmeyer, 
deceased, MRS. F R E D E R I C K 
STEIGMEYER, THE STATE OF 
UTAH, and all persons unknown 
claiming any right, title estate, lien 
or interest in the real property de-
scdbed in the complaint adverse to 
the plaintiff's ownership or clouding 
the plaintiff's title thereto, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and respondent in this court, is 
not in agreement with the statement of facts as 
set forth in the appellants' brief. 
Over the plaintiff's and respondents objection 
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made in the court below (R. 81, 82) defendants 
and appellants prevailed in having the Lower Court 
amend the original proposed findings of fact and 
particularly finding Number 11 thereof, by the in-
clusion of what was viewed by the plaintiff as a 
great surplusage of evidentiary material, not neces-
sary to the decision. There is no dispute that the 
findings made by the court, (R. 102,-106 incl.) and 
referred to by the appellant in their brief at Page 
2 thereof with approval, are the facts. Nevertheless, 
appellants after having cited the courts findings 
promptly depart from them in setting forth their ~ 
argumentive version of the facts. We submit that 
basically the facts in this case and as found by the 
lower court are as follows : ~ 
The State of Utah was granted by law the 
right to select certain federal lands as grants in 
aid of the Agricultural College and to sell the land 
j 
so acquired by it. One Joseph Henshaw signed an 
agreement to purchase selected lands on the 24th I 
day of November 1902 and submitted the same , 
in the manner and form required by law to the 4 
State of Utah, accompanied by the requisite pay-
ment on deposit, all of which appears from an ex-
amination of the Land Board records (R. 51), and 
particularly the documents contained therein con-
sisting of excerpts from the Minute Book of the 
State Board of Land Commissioners, from the sales 
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record, and the document entitled "Agreement to 
t Purchase Selected Land''. 
The Agreement to Purchase Selected Land so 
filed by Henshaw was duly accepted by the State 
on the 3rd day of December 1902 (R. 51) and the 
State made the necessary selection of lands and 
submitted the same to the United States Land Of-
fice on the same day. The United States Land Office 
approved the selection on December 16, 1902. Ap-
proval by the Washington D.C. land office was had 
on December 1, 1904. Thereafter, on the 1st day of 
January 1905, certificate of sale #8515 was duly 
issued by the State of Utah to Joseph Henshaw (R. 
51). On March 30th, 1914, the State of Utah re-
ceived the final payment constituting payment in 
full to the State of Utah of the consideration due 
on the purchase of the land under the certificate 
aforesaid (R. 17, 18). 
Joseph Henshaw died in September 1905 (R. 
51, 104). Prior to his death, as shown by the records 
of the State Land Board, he transferred his interest 
in the Certificate of Sale aforesaid, to one A. B. 
Lewis (R. 51). On December 28, 1910, A. B. Lewis, 
as shown by land board records ( R. 51 ) , assigned 
and transferred the Certificate to Lewisiana Land 
Company, which company assigned and transferred 
said certificate to William Story, Jr., and Frederick 
Steigmeyer, a co-partnership, on August 21, 1914. 
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None of these assignments were recorded in the 
office of the County Recorder of Beaver County. 
William MacArthur Story, Marion S. Goeltz, Flor-
ence M. Story Haines and Eleanor Story Nowels, 
appellants herein, are the assignees and successors 
in interest of said William Story, Jr., and Freder-
ick Steigmeyer, a co-partnership. One Gus S. Holmes 
having acquired a money judgment in the District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, against 
A. B. Lewis, procured to be issed to the Sheriff of 
Beaver County a writ of execution on March 4, 
1914. Under said writ the said sheriff sold at sher-
iff's sale to said Gus S. Holmes on March 28, 1914, 
the interest of A. B. Lewis in the real estate describ-
ed in said Land Board Certificate. Sheriff's Certi-
ficate of Sale of said real estate on execution was 
issued March 28, 1914 to Gus S. Holmes, and duly 
recorded in the office of the Recorder of Beaver 
County (R. 51, Ex. 1 & 2). Thereafter Gus S. Holmes 
applied to the State Land Board for issuance of 
patent to the lands in question. The application was 
resisted by Story and Steigmeyer. (R. 51) 
The Land Board sought a determination by the 
Attorney General as to whom patent should be issued 
and it was the Attorney General's ruling made 
in March 1915 that the sale by the Sheriff to Gus 
S. Holmes should be ignored and patent issued to 
Lewisiana Land Co., upon compliance with certain 
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conditions. (R. 51) The State Land Board advised 
Lewisiana Land Company and Story and Steig-
meyer, its attorneys, of the requirements for the 
issuance of patent by letter dated July 8, 1915 (R. 
51). By its further letter of July 14, directed to the 
same parties ( R. 51) it was stated: 
"That in addition to the requirement 
made in the said letter (referring to the letter 
of July 8) you will have the County Treasurer 
of Beaver County notify this office of the 
redemption of the tax sale for the 1911 and 
subsequent years." 
An examination of the files of the State Land· 
Board with respect to this land and Certificate 
#8515, does not reflect that the appellants prede-
cessors in interest ever complied with the require-
ments and submitted the necessary documents to 
permit the State of Utah to issue its formal patent 
to the lands in question (R. 51). Nor did the appel-
lants or their predecessors in interest ever pay the 
taxes or redeem the tax sales as required. (R. 51, 
Ex. 1 & 2, 105-6) 
No action was ever taken by the appellants 
or their predecessors in interest to correct the 
status of the record title to -this land in the 
office of the Beaver County Recorder and it 
stands as of today, in the order of succession de-
termined by the tax sale by Beaver County of the 
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interest of Gus S. Holmes, the purchaser at the 
sale on execution. (R. 51, Ex. 1 & 2) 
The lands in question were assessed by the 
County Assessor of Beaver County in the name 
of Joseph Henshaw for the years 1906 to 1911 
inclusive and in the name of the Estate of Joseph 
Henshaw for the years 1912 thru 1916 inclusive 
( R. 73-7 4) . In 1917, a portion of this land, namely 
the South lf2 of Section 17 was for the first time 
assessed in the name of Gus S. Holmes. The re-
mainder was assessed in the name of the estate 
of Joseph Henshaw (R. 73,74). From 1918 to 1940, 
all of the lands were assessed in the name of Gus 
S. Holmes ( R. 73, 7 4). Taxes assessed against the 
lands were not paid and the lands were sold to 
Beaver County for non-payment of taxes. On Jan-
uary 2, 1937, an auditors tax deed on the tax sale 
was issued to Beaver County and duly recorded 
(R. 51, Exhibit 1, Pages 11, 12; Exhibit 2, Page 
25). Thereafter in the year 1940, Beaver County 
proceeded to foreclose its tax lien in an action com-
menced in the District Court for Beaver County, 
Civil File No. 2060 (R. 106, Finding #11). A de-
fault judgment was taken and a sheriff's deed on 
foreclosure sale was issued to Beaver County on or 
about May 1st, 1941. The plaintiff purchased the 
property from Beaver County under contract ap-
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111:\1'' 
on the 5th day of June 1941 (R. 106). The contract 
was paid out by the plaintiff, respondent herein, 
and Beaver County gave its deed to the respondent 
under date of December 11, 1945 (R. 106, R. 51, 
Exhibit 1, Page 16; Exhibit 2, Page 30). Ever 
since the date of acquisition under the contract, the 
5th day of June 1941, respondent has been in the 
exclusive, open, continuous, uninterrupted and ad-
verse possession and occupancy of all of the said 
real property under a claim right and title and has 
paid all of the taxes regularly levied and assessed 
thereon according to law (R. 68, 75, 106). 
The appellants predecessors in title are not 
presently and never have at any time been in the 
actual possession of the land in controversy, nor 
have they received any part of the rents, issues or 
profits from said lands ( R. 68) . 
Respondent desiring to secure patent to the 
lands which it had acquired from Beaver County 
as noted above, approached the State Land Board 
and after a conference with one of the commission-
ers and the Land Board attorney, wrote to the Hon-
orable Herbert Smart, Commissioner requesting ad-
vice as to the requirements which would be made 
by the State in order to enable the respondent to 
secure patent. (R. 51, Page 37 of the Land Board 
Records) . By letter dated May 17, directed to Allen 
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H. Tibbals, one of the attorneys for respondent, 
respondent was advised 
"You are advised that if you wish to bring 
an action to quiet title in order that the state 
may patent the land to the custodians law-
fully thereto entitled, it will be necessary for 
you to join Mr. Steigmeyer and Mr. Story 
or those claiming under them. When this is 
completed, the Board will issue patents in ac--
cordance with the Decree of the Court." ( R. 
51, Page 40 of the Land Board Records)." 
Action was instituted accordingly by the filing 
of the complaint, issuance of summons, and publi-
cation of summons thereon (R. 1-16 incl.). The 
State of Utah was joined as a party defendant in 
order that the court, might be vested with jurisdic-
tion to direct the state to whom to issue patent after 
de termination of the issues between the litigants. 
The state answered, setting up the fact that the 
land had been sold under Certificate of Sale, that 
payment in full was received by the State, March ~ 
30th, 1914; disclaimed any beneficial interest in or ~ 
to the lands in question and further indicated its ! 
willingness to issue patent to the party determined j 
by the court to be the lawful claimant thereto (R. 
17, 18). Details of the various arguments, motions, ~ 
etc. before the court appear to be surplusage in this 
statement of facts and are not recited for that 
reason since appallants raise no issue and do not 
assign as error any of the rulings of the court made 
on any of the motions. 
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The statement of facts made by the appellants 
in their brief, contains statements not in conformity 
with the record which the respondent brings to the 
attention of the court as briefly as possible in com-
pliance with Rule 75 (P) (2). Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Appellants state at Page 1 and 2 of their brief: 
"This is an appeal by four of the above 
defendants from a judgment of the District 
Court of Beaver County, the Hon. Will L. 
Hoyt, Judge, presiding, quieting title by ad-
verse possession to certain unpatented state 
school lands in Beaver County in favor of 
plaintiff and against the defendant, State of 
Utah, holder of legal title * * * ". 
The judgment of the Trial Court cannot be 
truthfully considered adverse to the State of Utah. 
The judgment of the Trial Court is adverse to the 
appellants who were purchasers of the land from 
the State of Utah. Throughout the entire proceed-
ings in this case, in the lower court and also in this 
court, appellants have adhered to this same policy 
of attempting to identify themselves with the State 
of Utah as though they were the State and any 
action adverse to them has been classified by them 
as being also adverse to the State of Utah. Such is 
not the fact. The disclaimer filed by the State (R. 
17 and 18), the memorandum decision of Judge 
Hoyt ( R. 7 6) and the decree entered by the Court 
(R. 110-111) support the statement by Respondents 
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that this judgment is not in any sense hostile to 
the State of Utah. 
Appellants at page 2 of their brief state: 
"It was stipuated and the Court found 
(Par. 13) neither appellants nor any of their 
predecessors in interest have ever, at any 
time, under the certificate, taken possession 
of the lands from the State, or received any 
part of the rents, issues or profits therefrom. 
The State has, therefore, never relinquished 
either title to or possession of the land to the 
purchaser.'' 
The fact is, that a stipulation was made and 
entered into between counsel for the respective 
parties to the effect that 
"Defendant or defendants, predecessors 
in title or any of them and particularly any 
person claiming by, through or under William 
Story, Jr., and Frederick Steigmeyer, or 
either of them are not now and never have at 
any time, been seized or in possession of any 
part of the lands in controversy herein, or re-
ceived any part of the rent, issues, or profits 
from said lands." ( R. 68, 69) 
It was neither stipulated nor did the Court find 
as a fact that the State had never relinquished either 
title or possession of the land to the purchaser. 
Again at Page 2 and 3 of Appellants' brief, 
we find included in Appellants' statement of facts 
an argumentative analysis of the complaint filed by 
respondent in the lower court. This statement is not' 
10 
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factual, but is purely argumentative. (For the full 
text of Appellants' statement see appendices page 
51.) 
Respondent's complaint was drawn in the form 
required to cmnply with the statutory procedure for 
quieting title. Since respondent was already in pos-
session and had been since June 5th, 1941 neither 
trespass or ejectment appeared appropriate. (R. 
17, 18). It should be noted that the sufficiency of the 
complaint has never been attacked by the appellants 
herein. No issue was raised in the court below, 
nor is any made in the assignment of errors or the 
statement of points in the appellants' brief with 
respect to the sufficiency of the complaint. The 
argu1nentative analysis of the plaintiff's com-
plaint made by appellants may or may not be a valid 
analysis of the complaint and its function, but under 
the circumstances nothing is before this court for 
determination with respect to the matter of the 
complaint and the statement voluntarily included as 
a statement of fact in appellant's brief, we, there-
fore, respectfully suggest to the court is both mis-
placed and inaccurate and cannot be considered a 
factual statement supported by the record. 
We direct the courts attention to the appellants 
brief at Page 3 with respect to assessment of taxes 
on the lands in question : 
"After that time until 1940, they were 
erroneously assessed in the name of Gus S. 
Holmes, a complete stranger to both land 
11 
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and certificate, apparently by reason of a 
sheriffs certificate of sale on execution issued 
March 28, 1914 to Gus S. Holmes against one 
A. B. Lewis who on the date of execution 
by ruling of the attorney general and decision 
of the Land Board, had no interest in either 
land or certificate (R. 105, and Land Board 
Records R. 51)''. (Italics ours) 
The facts in connection with this matter are 
that the taxes were actually assessed from 1906 
through 1916 in the name of either Joseph Henshaw 
or his estate by the Assessor of Beaver County. In 
1917, the South :Y2 of Section 17 was assessed in 
the name of Gus S. Holmes (R. 74.) In 1918, all 
of the lands in question were assessed in the name 
of Gus S. Holmes ( R. 7 4). The statement by the 
appellants in their brief as above quoted that the 
assessment in the name of Holmes was "erroneous" 
as well as their further statement that, "Gus S. 
Holmes was a stranger to both land and certifi-
cate," are conclusions in which the respondents do 
not concur and which cannot be logically drawn 
from the evidence before the trial court. The refer-
ence by Appellants to the opinion of the Land Board 
and of the Attorney General do not strengthen the 
conclusions drawn by the Appellants. The Trial 
Judge specifically pointed out that he did not be-
lieve himself bound by the rulings of the Attorney 
General and indicated that he believed them im-
material ( R. 80). He included the fact of the exist-
12 
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ence of these rulings in his findings only as a con-
cession to the defendants theory of the case (R. 
80). We believe it significant that the Trial Court 
drew no such conclusion as that drawn by the Ap-
pellants (R. 106, 107). 
In the second full paragraph on Page 4 of the 
Appellant's brief, we find the following statement: 
"'The Attorney General filed an answer 
for the State on May 2nd, 1956 (R. 17), at-
tempting to disclaim on behalf of the State 
any "right, title or interest" in the lands and 
attempting to renounce any statutory or con-
stiutional duty or obligation of the state in 
connection therewith * * *" 
It is a fact that the Attorney General, after due 
consideration of the matter, by the State Land 
Board, and by members of his own staff (R. 51, 
Pages 38, 39, 40, 49, and 50) did issue an answer 
in which (R. 17, 18), the Attorney General on be-
half of the State of Utah sets forth the fact that 
in the year 1902, a State Land Certificate #8515 
was issued to one Joseph Henshaw for the purchase 
of certain described state agrciultural college lands, 
being the lands in question in this case, and that on 
March 30th, 1914, the State of Utah received final 
payment of the purchase of the lands. There-
fore, the State of Utah, disclaimed any right, title, 
or interest in the lands and indicated it stands ready, 
willing and able to issue a patent to the land describ-
ed upon the final ajudication of the interests of the 
13 
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persons named as parties defendant. To characterize 
this action taken by the Attorney General on behalf 
of the State of Utah as "an attempt to renounce any 
statutory or constitutional duty or obligation of the 
State in connection therewith," as is done by the 
Appellant in the statement of facts in their brief, 
is manifestly unfair to the Attorney General and 
does not fairly or factually characterize the action 
taken by the Attorney General. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
Appellants set forth their argument in their 
brief under points which do not coincide in wording 
with the Assignments of Error set forth at page 
6 of the appellants' brief. In replying to the Appel-
lants' brief, we shall set forth our argument under 
the points as set out in appellants brief, and we are 
grouping with the appellants point the Assignment 
of error to which we deem the point to relate. It is 
noted that there is no point relating to assignment 
of error number 4. We have chosen, therefor, to 
set out the affirmative of our position on this matter 
and discuss the assignment of error under this af-
firmative statement of the point. 
POINT I 
STATE AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL LANDS GRANT-
ED TO THE STATE BY THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT ARE HELD IN TRUST FOR THE PEOPLE 
TO BE DISPOSED OF AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY 
LAW AND RELINQUISHMENT OF TITLE BY THE 
STA'TE OTHERWISE THAN BY WAY OF A SALE 
14 
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AND ISSUANCE OF PATENT TO A PERSON OTHER 
THAN A PURCHASER, HIS ASSIGNEE OR SUCCES-
SOR IN INTEREST, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND 
VOID AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ENABLING 
ACT, THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
STATE STATUTES PERTAINING TO THE ADMINIS-
TRATION, MANAGEMENT AND SALE OF S'TA'TE 
LANDS. 
1. The court erred in permitting title to State 
Agricultural College School lands received from the 
Federal Government to be relinquished by the State 
not by purchase but under State Statutes of limi-
tations based on adverse possession, the decree being 
unconstitutional and void under the provisions of 
the Enabling Act, the Utah State Constitution and 
the statutes pertaining to the administration, dis-
posal and sale of such state lands. 
POINT II 
UNDER UTAH LAW POSSESSION OF LANDS 
CANNOT BE ADVERSE PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF 
PATENT. 
The Court erred in holding that adverse pos-
session under State statutes of limitations com-
mences to run not from the date of issuance of the 
patent but from the date of final payment of the 
State Land Certificate. 
POINT III 
THE COURT WILL NOT LEND ITS AID IN A 
SUIT BASED ON A DEED ACQUIRED BY MALFEAS-
ANCE OF PUBLIC OFFICE. 
The Court erred in holding that a quiet title 
decree may be based on an official abuse of public 
trust and malfeasance of office. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO ORDER THE STATE TO ISSUE PATENT TO 
15 
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THE APPELLANTS AS PURCHASERS OF THE LAND 
FROM THE STATE BUT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO THE IS-
SUANCE OF PATENT. 
The Court erred in refusing to order the State 
to issue patent to appellants as purchasers of the 
land from the State. 
(Italics are ours and used to indicate the as-
signment of error by the appellant as set forth in 
Page 6 of their brief. Though no point 4 appears 
in appellants brief, we have chosen to set forth the 




In its argument respondent will set forth its 
position in this matter essentially under the points 
as presented in the brief of the appellant with nota-
tion thereunder of the assignment of error to which 
we believe the point relates. The entire situation in 
the presentation of respondent's side of this case 
is unusual in that there is no essential disagreement 
between appellants and respondent as to the law 
and it will be noted that both parties cite many of 
the same cases in support of their respective theories 
of the case. It is primarily the position of the res-
pondent that the appellants incorrectly interpret and 
misapply the existing law and do not recognize the 
facts as they actually exist. We believe that this 
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situation can be clearly pointed out to the court in 
the course of the argument. 
POINT I 
STATE AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL LANDS GRANT-
ED TO THE STATE BY THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT ARE HELD IN TRUST FOR THE PEOPLE 
TO BE DISPOSED OF AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY 
LAW AND RELINQUISHMENT OF TITLE BY THE 
STATE OTHERWISE THAN BY WAY OF A SALE 
AND ISSUANCE OF PATENT TO A PERSON OTHER 
THAN A PURCHASER, HIS ASSIGNEE OR SUCCES-
SOR IN INTEREST, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND 
VOID AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ENABLING 
ACT, THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
STATE STATUTES PERTAINING TO THE ADMINIS-
TRATION, MANAGEMENT AND SALE OF STATE 
LANDS. 
1. The court erred in permitting title to State 
Agricultural College School lands received from the 
Federal Government to be relinquished by the State 
not by purchase but under State Statutes of limi-
tations based on adverse possession, the decree being 
unconstitutional and void under the provisions of 
the Enabling Act, the Utah State Constitution and 
the statutes pertaining to the administration, dis-
posal and sale of such state lands. 
Appellants correctly state the law in Point I 
of their brief as follows: 
"State Agricultural School lands granted 
to the State by the Federal Government are 
held by the State in trust for the people to be 
disposed of as may be provided by law and 
the relinquishment of title by the State in any 
other manner than by sale and issuance of 
patent to a person becoming the purchaser 
thereof would indeed be unconstitutional and 
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void and in contravention of the Enabling Act 
and in violation of the State constitution and 
statutes relating to administration and man-
agement of state lands." 
The only claim which appellants have to the 
lands in question is as purchasers of state lands 
from the State in accordance with law and the Con-
stitution. The attempt by appellants to characterize 
the disposition of these lands as having been made 
by the state in a manner other than that authorized 
by law is not in accordance with facts. Joseph Hen-
shaw, one of the predecessors in title of the appel-
lants, made a proper selection in the manner requir-
ed by law, of state lands granted to the State by the 
Federal Government in aid of the Agricultural Col-
lege ( R. 51) . Joseph Henshaw and his successors 
in interest, paid the State of Utah the full consider-
ation for these lands (R. 17, 18, 51). The State re-
ceived the final payment on March 30, 1914 (R. 
17, 18, 51). The State was then left at this point 
vested with only the naked legal title to this land 
impressed with the right by Joseph Henshaw and 
his successors in interest to the issuance of patent 
from the state upon compliance with the necessary 
formalities to show their true succession to Joseph 
Henshaw's interest and the payment of taxes as 
required by state law. There is no irregularity cited 
by the appellants from the beginning to the end of 
their brief or in any of the proceedings before the 
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lower court, in the action of the State of Utah 
through its designated officials in making the sale 
to Joseph Henshaw, in accepting the payment there-
on, or in the distribution of the funds received there-
from. The entire procedure was regular and proper. 
What the appellant seeks to do is to invest Joseph 
Henshaw and his successors in interest with im-
munity from the intervening claims of others to the 
lands which he thus bought from the state, and to 
do so the appellant seeks to confuse the issue by 
attempting to make it appear that the State of Utah 
is an in teres ted party in this action by reason of 
the fact that the ministerial function of the issu-
ance of patent has not yet been carried out, and that 
respondents action is perforce adverse to the state. 
The action brought here by respondent against 
the appellants is one in which the State is joined 
merely because it holds the naked legal title to the 
land in question. It is not an action adverse to 
the state. The mere fact that the state holds naked 
legal title does not preclude respondents from the 
perfection of an adverse title against the appellants. 
We believe the following quotation from American 
Jurisprudence on the subject clearly states the law: 
"* * * 'The holder of a receipt or certi-
ficate of purchase from the state is the equit-
able owner of the land and indefeasibly en-
titled to a patent; such receipt or certificate 
is inchoate evidence of an absolute title, the 
state then being merely a naked trustee of the 
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legal title, which it is bound to convey to such 
equitable owner on demand, and it has no 
right thereafter to sell and convey the land 
to another * * *". - 42 Am. Jur., PUBLIC 
LANDS P. 857,8 Sec. 80. 
The California case of Z. Russ & Sons Co. vs. 
Crichton, Tax Collector, 49 P. 1043 holds: 
"The state owned the lands, and when, 
on payment of a part of the purchase price, 
it issued its certificates of purchase therefor, 
an equitable title vested in the purchasers, 
which was subject to assessment for taxes. 
* * *" 
Corpus Juris Secundum- PUBLIC LANDS 
- Vol. 73, Page 884, Sec. 242 states the rule: 
"A certificate of purchase does not pass 
the legal title, but such title remains in the 
state until the patent issues; but where, on 
payment of part of the purchase price of 
state lands, a certificate of purchase is issued 
by the state, an equitable title to the land 
vests in the purchaser. * * *" 
The Supreme Court of the United States has 
held in the case of Barney vs. Dolph, 97 US 652, 
24 L. Ed. 1063: 
"Where the right to a patent has become 
vested in a purchaser of public lands, it is 
equivalent, so far as the government is con-
cerned, to a patent actually issued. The exe-
cution of and delivery of a patent after the 
right to it has become complete are the mere 
ministerial acts of the officers charged with 
that duty." 
Being thus vested with the absolute equitable 
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title, can the interest of the appellants be subject 
to adverse possession by others? Again there seems 
to be no dispute in the law on this matter. 
"In the absence of legislation providing 
otherwise, the Statute of Limitation does not 
run against the Government, and, therefore, 
title to public lands cannot be acquired by ad-
verse possession either as against the United 
States or as against any of the several states, 
in some of which there are constitutional 
and statutory provisions to this effect. This 
rule, however, has no application in litigation 
where the state is only a nominal party, its 
name being used merely for the enforcement 
of the rights of third persons who alone will 
enjoy the benefits. * * * Even where the 
statute does not run against the government, 
one '11ULY acquire rights in public lands by ad-
verse occupancy against all third persons, 
and this is true .even though the claimant ad-
mits the governments ownership, in other 
words, the claimant's possession may be ad-
verse without being hostile to the govern-
ment." 1 Am. Jur. Adverse Possession P. 848-
9 Sec. 104. (Italics ours) 
In the case of Fear vs. Barwise, Kansas 93 
Kan. 131, 143 P. 505, the above quoted phrase from 
American Jurisprudence is quoted from its original 
source, Ruling Case Law, with approval at Page 507 
of the opinion. 
We submit that these authorities outline the 
position of the respondents in this case. We do not 
make, and never have made any claim hostile to the 
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State of Utah. This fact is recognized by the plead .. 
ing filed by the attorney general (R. 17, 18) but we 
do claim adverse possession under claim of right and 
ti tie against the appellants. This very vi tal fact is 
the one which distinguishes this case from all of the 
authorities cited by appellants and makes the auth-
orities cited by appellants in their brief inapplicable. 
The Utah law specifically requires that upon 
the issuance of a certificate of sale by the State 
Land Board the County Assessor in the County in 
which the lands so sold or covered by the certificate 
of sale may lie shall assess the interest of the pur-
chaser under the certificate of sale to the extent 
of the money paid or then due. (Sec. 59-2-2 UCA 
1953, R.S. 1898 & 1907 S 2502, Also see Stowell 
vs. State 100 U. 420-115 P. 2d 914). 
The assessments made as indicated by there-
cords of Beaver County and incorporated in the 
stipulation between the parties hereto ( R. 73, 7 4) 
were made by the Beaver County Assessor in ac-
cordance with law in the name of Joseph Henshaw 
and subsequently in the name of his estate thru the 
year 1916. 
'The laws of Utah 1919 Chapter 113, Sec. 1, 
added to the law the following: 
''And provided further that where final 
payment has been made upon such lands the 
contract of sale shall, for the purpose of tax-
ation, be regarded as passing title to the pur-
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chaser or assignee, and the Secretary of the 
land board shall immediately certify the re-
ceipt of such final payment to the Assessor 
of the county where such lands are located, 
and the assessor shall thereupon place such 
lands upon the assessment roll of such county." 
Prior to the time of final payment to the state 
under the certificate March 30th, 1914 (R. 17, 18) 
and the time of inclusion of the lands as such on the 
assessment roll, it appears that one Gus S. Holmes 
acquired a money judgment in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and proceeded 
to have the same abstracted and docketed in Beaver 
County and the Sheriff of Beaver County was there-
upon instructed to levy execution on the lands in 
question and sell so much thereof as necessary to 
satisfy the execution. ( R. 105). Gus S. Holmes 
bought the lands at the execution sale. (R. 105) Gus 
S. Holmes properly recorded the certificate of sale 
and Sheriff's deed, with the Recorder of Beaver 
County, Utah. (R. 51, Ex. 1 P. 8) (R. 51 Ex. 2 P. 8). 
Though the predecessors in interest to appellants 
proceeded to contest the right of Gus S. Holmes 
to issuance of patent (R. 51) before the State Land 
Board, and succeeded in getting an opinion from 
the Attorney General that the assignment made by 
A. B. Lewis, to the Lewisiana Land Company of the 
Certificate of Sale No. 8515, was valid and defeated 
the rights of Gus S. Holmes as against A. B. Lewis 
as an individual, nothing was ever done to correct 
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the status of the record in Beaver County in the 
office of the Recorder thereof, or in the office of 
the Assessor. (R. 51, Ex. 1, & 2, and R. 73, 74). 
Therefore, when as required by law the Assessor,: 
included the lands on the assessment roll he did so' 
from the year 1917, as to the South lf2 of Sec. 17, 
and from the year 1918 on all of the lands in the 
name of Gus S. Holmes. This is in accordance with 
the law. The Utah law, Section 59-5-12 UCA 1953 
originally appearing in the 1898 Revised Statutes 
as Section 2524 provides: 
''* * * If the name of the owner or claim-
ant of any property is known to the Assessor 
or if it appears of record at the Office of the 
County Recorder where the property is situ-
ated, the property must be assessed in such 
name; if unknown to the assessor and if it 
does not appear of record as aforesaid, the 
property must be assessed to unknown own-
ers." 
The assessment in the name of Gus S. Holmes 
was a strict compliance by the Assessor with the 
law quoted. Thus we find the lands properly assessed 
in the name of Gus S. Holmes. When the taxes were 
not paid the County thereafter caused the same to 
be sold for delinquent taxes and ultimately the res-
pondent became the purchaser from the county, ~ 
thereby acquiring color of title. ( R. 51, Ex. 1 P. 
1112, 13, 14, 15, 16; & Ex. 2 P. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 30) The respondent immediately entered j 
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into possession of the lands upon entering into the 
contract with Beaver County for acquisition of title 
on June 5th, 1941, and ever since said date has oc-
cupied the lands under claim of right, openly, ad-
versly, exclusively, continuously and uninterruptedly 
and paid all taxes regularly levied and assessed 
thereon according to law. (R. 68, 69, 75, 106 Find-
ing 12.) 
That the Appellants were entitled to possession 
under the certificate of sale and that respondents 
holding of the land in question was therefor ad-
verse to the appellants we believe is established by 
the following cases. 
It is the established and recognized law of this 
state that the purchaser under a certificate of sale 
issued as in this case, is entitled to the immediate 
possession of the land, could enter upon the land, 
cultivate it, improve it and was entitled to any crops 
produced thereon. We specifically refer to the case 
of Young vs. Corless found at 56 Utah 564, 191 
Pac. 64 7 decided by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
year 1920. In that case the Supreme Court stated: 
"* * * Under the certificates of sale and 
the law authorizing the issuance of the same, 
the purchaser was entitled to immediate pos-
session, and could enter upon the land, cul-
tivate it, improve it, and was entitled to any 
crops produced thereon. * * *" (Young vs. 
Corless 56 Utah 564; 191 Pac. 647) 
That this is the effect of a certificate of sale 
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is also recognized in the later case of MeN iel vs. 
McNiel decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 1922 
and found at 61 Utah 141, 211 Pac. 988. In the case 
of Livingston vs. Thornley decided by the Supreme 
Court of Utah in 1929 and found at 74 Utah 561, 
280 Pac. 1042, the Supreme Court was confronted 
with a problem involving the right of one possessing 
lands under purchase from the state to initiate and 
prosecute to successful conclusion a trespass action 
against a defendant who had permitted sheep to 
trespass upon the land for which the plaintiff was 
entitled to a certificate of sale from the state. The 
court there said: 
"* * * The presumption may well 
be indulged that when the legislature by 
its enactment, laws of Utah 1925, Chapter 31, 
Section 5594, required that the purchaser of 
state land shall pay interest on deferred pay-
ments from and after the date of sale, it was 
the intention of the legislature that such pur-
chaser should be entitled to possession of the 
land purchased from and after the date of 
purchase. The mere fact that the State Land 
Board may delay in issuing a certificate of 
sale cannot well be said to effect the right of 
a purchaser to possession of the land pur-
chased. * * *" 
The Supreme Court thereby recognized the fact 
that a purchaser even though he had not yet received 
the certificate of sale could support the action of 
trespass against trespassers upon lands which he 
was purchasing from the State. 
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In the light of the cases cited, there seems to 
be no question but that Joseph Henshaw and his 
successors, predecessors in title to the appellants, 
were entitled to the possession of the lands described 
in the certificate of sale No. 8515, from and after 
the date of issuance thereof, January 1, 1905 (R. 
51, Land Board Record, R. 106). Joseph Henshaw 
and his successors in title, the predecessors in in-
terest through which appellants claim were entitled 
to the issuance of patent as well. The fact that they 
failed to pay the taxes levied in the manner required 
by law by the Beaver County Assessor, and other-
wise failed to complete the requisite formalities re-
quired of them by the State Land Board by its 
letters of July 8, and 14th, 1915 (R. 51) did not 
reinvest the State of. Utah with the beneficial in-
terest in this property since the State had received 
full payment of all monies due it on the purchase 
contract. The State was therefore left only the min-
isterial function of issuing patent. The interest of 
the State had been disposed of in accordance with 
law to a purchaser, to wit, Joseph Henshaw, and 
it is through this purchaser that the appellants 
claim. It having been established by the authorities 
above cited that the appellants predecessors in title 
were entitled to possession of the lands in question 
and that they could have maintained an action to 
evict a trespasser on the lands or ejected an unlaw-
ful claimant holding the lands, it logically follows 
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that if the respondents held the lands adversly, hos-
tily, continuously, uninterruptedly under claim of 
right and paid all taxes lawfully levied thereon for 
the statutory period they would acquire title by ad-
verse possession which would cut off the rights of 
the appellants and their predecessors in title. That 
the respondents so held the lands is admitted by 
stipulation. (R. 68, 69) and was so found by the 
court (R. 106). The statutory period for establish-
ing title by adverse possession is set by 78-12-5 
DCA 1953 which was 104-12-15 in the 1933 and 
1943 codes, at seven years. The requirements that 
taxes be paid is created by 78-12-12 DCA 1953, 
which was 104-12-12 in the 1933 and 1943 codes. 
The attempt by appellants to save themselves from 
this consequence by attempting to identify them-
selves with the State of Utah because patent had not 
issued, we submit, must fail. 
Not one authority cited by the appellants in 
their brief holds that the interest of purchaser of 
state lands under a State Land Certificate can not 
be the subject of adverse possession. The authorities 
are to the contrary. The authorities cited by the 
appellant generally speaking involve an adverse ac-
tion directed against the state involving lands which 
had not been acquired under a certificate of sale or 
purchased from the state. For example the appellant 
cites the Van Wagoner vs. Whitemore case, 58 Utah 
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418, 199 P. 670, decided by the Utah Supreme Court 
in 1921 as determinative of the issues in this case. 
We have no quarrel with the Van Wagoner vs. Whit-
more case or any of the other authorities cited by 
the appellant. They state the law and state it accur-
ately. The appellant simply misapplies the same to 
the factual situation involved in this case. The dis-
tinction between the Van Wagoner vs. Whitmore 
case and the present situation is that George C. 
Whitmore had been in open and notorious occupancy 
and possession of the land in question prior to the 
date on which the State of Utah was admitted to 
the Union. He had inclosed the land with a fence 
and made other ir.aprovements. At the time, that 
the State of Utah was admitted to the Union a pro-
vision was incorporated into the law, whereby one 
who was in possession of land then given to the 
state by the Federal Government in grants in aid 
of schools could make application and exercise pre-
ference rights for acquisition of title. Whitmore 
did not take this action. Instead he sought to ac-
quire the lands by claiming that he had held them 
adversely to the State of Utah. The State in the 
meantime sold the lands to Van Wagoner under a 
proper application and selection in accordance with 
the Utah Law. The issue in the Van Wagoner case 
was not whether or not there could be an adverse 
interest acquired against the purchaser of State 
lands from the State but the question raised was 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
whether or not Whitrnore by reason of his occupancy 
of the lands prior to the acceptance of Utah into the 
Union and his refusal thereafter to inaugurate the 
necessary steps to acquire title by preference as 
provided by law could hastily acquire title to this 
land in an action against the State and thereby de-
prive the state of the revenue it was intended by 
Congress it should receive. The Supreme Court held 
that he could not do so. 
We quote from the courts statement of the facts 
in the Van Wagoner case, Page 671: 
"It is an undisputed fact that George C. 
Whitmore was in the open and notorious oc-
cupancy and possession of the land in ques-
tion ever since long before Utah was admitted 
into the Union. It is also undisputed that he 
inclosed the land with a fence, made other 
improvements thereon, such as the construc-
tion of water ditches, and that he cultivated 
the land and produced crops thereon from 
year to year. * * * and as to whether or not 
he intended to hold adversely to the state, 
which at the date of its admission into the 
Union became the legal owner of the property, 
does not appear, but for the purposes of the 
discussion the fact may be admitted. * * *" 
The Court then analyzes the applicable statutes 
and particularly the statutes creating the limitation 
on the action, being the san1e as are applicable to 
the instant case, and points out at page 673 of the 
opinion that everything necessary had been done 
to comply with the Statute to create an adverse 
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title against the State of Utah. The court says how-
ever, that such an end cannot be considered as hav-
ing been the intention in the enactment of the sta-
tutes referred to and quotes with approval the case 
of Murtaugh vs. C. M. & St. P. Rd. 112 N. W. 860 
as being the correct interpretation of the statutes 
in question at page 675 of the Utah opinion: 
"We are, then of the opinion that, if the 
statute under consideration must be construed 
as authorizing the acquisition of title to the 
school lands of the state by adverse posses-
sion, it violates in this respect not only the 
terms of the grant, but also of the Constitu-
tion of the state. We are, however, of the opi-
nion that the statute (referring to a statute 
identical in all pertinent application to Utah 
Statute 78-12-2) fairly may be given a con-
struction which is consistent with the terms 
of the school land grant and the provisions 
of the State Constitution applicable thereto. 
If the Statute be read in connection with the 
general and well understood rule of law that 
title to public land cannot be acquired by ad-
verse possession, the history of our school land 
grant, the nature of the title of the state to its 
school lands and the mandates of our Con-
stitution with reference to them, it is clear 
upon the face of the statute that the Legisla-
ture did not intend to provide for the acquisi-
tion of the title to school lands by adverse 
posession. We accordingly hold that title to 
lands granted to the State of Minnesota for 
the use of its schools by the United States 
cannot be acquired by adverse possession, as 
against the state." 
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This language adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court from the Minnesota opinion clearly is limited 
in its application to acquisition of title adversely to 
the State. 
In the case now before the Court, the State 
of Utah did dispose of the lands in the manner re-
quired by law, not by adverse possession, and there 
has never been any question raised but what the 
funds paid by Joseph Henshaw to the State of 
Utah for the acquisition of the lands represented 
by Certificate 8515 were properly applied to the 
purposes for which the lands were granted to the 
state. In the Whitmore case, obviously had Whit-
more been permitted to prevail in his hostile action 
against the State of Utah and thereby achieve a 
title without recognition of the ownership by the 
State and without complying with the law of the 
State of Utah for acquisition of title, the State 
would have been deprived of the funds which it was 
the intention of Congress it should have. 
At Page 11, Appellants state in their brief re-
fering to themselves: 
"The State having accepted full payment 
for the lands from the appellants and their 
predecessors in interest is now honor bound 
to execute its constitutional trust and issue 
patent to the purchaser, his assignee or his 
successor in interest." 
The absurdity of the appellant's position is 
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manifest in this statement. Appellants, at one and 
the same time recognize that their only claim to 
these lands is as a purchaser from the State and 
they thereby admit the validity of the transaction 
whereby the, right to patent was acquired from the 
state. They then refuse to recognize that by virtue 
of other applicable laws of the state, to wit, the tax 
laws and the laws with respect to adverse posses-
sion, their rights as purchasers from the state might 
be cut off by an intervening claimant such as Res-
pondent in this case. 
POINT II 
UNDER UTAH LAW POSSESSION OF LANDS 
CANNOT BE ADVERSE PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF 
PATENT. 
The Court erred in holding that adverse pos-
session under State statutes of limitations com-
mences to run not from the date of issuance of the 
patent but from the date of final payment of the 
State Land Certificate. 
Respondent is not in accord with the position 
taken by the appellants on this point. We respect-
fully submit to this court that the holding of the 
lower court in regard thereto is sound and is in con-
formity with the established law. The position taken 
by the appellants is neither sound or logical nor is it 
sustained by the authorities cited by them. 
It must first be remembered in connection with 
the consideration of this point that the State of 
Utah has been paid the full consideration charged 
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l 
for the land in question. (R. 17, 18, 51) Respondent1' 
acquired its title to the land in question, under which 
it claims, from Beaver County, which county had 
acquired its interest in the lands by reason of sale 
for delinquent taxes. (R. 51, Ex. 1 & 2, 106.) From 
March 30th, 1914, date on which final payment 
under the certificate of sale was made to the State, 
until Respondent purchased the lands from Beaver 
County under contract, June 5th, 1941, the lands 
had stood from year to year on the delinquent tax 
rolls of Beaver County and the county had been de-
prived of any revenue therefrom. (R. 17, 18, 106, 
51 Ex. 1 & 2, and 68 & 69.) 
The law relating to the Selection of State Land 
is found enacted by Laws of Utah 1899 Chapter 64, 
and with minor amendments, largely as to the price 
to be paid therefore, comes to the 1953 Code basic-
ally unchanged as 65-1-32. It is admitted and found 
by the lower court as a fact that the provisions of 
the law with respect to the selection of the lands in 
question by Joseph Henshaw, predecessor in title of 
the appellants was complied with in all respects, and 
that Certificate of Sale issued to Joseph Henshaw. 
(R. 104 No. 8) The State Received payment in full 
under the Certificate. (R. 17, 18) Accordingly by 
the provisions of applicable law as now set forth 
at 65-1-43 UCA 1953 Henshaw or his successors in 
interest became entitled to patent upon the sur· 
render of the original certificate of sale plus the 
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payment of taxes due to the County as required by 
the provisions of 59-2-2 UCA 1953. Under this state 
of facts this court has already determined that the 
transaction constitutes a sale of the lands in ques-
tion and the purchaser is entitled to possession from 
and after the date of purchase and before issuance 
of the Certificate of Sale. Young vs. Corless, 56 U. 
564, 191 P. 647, and Livingston vs. Thornley, 74 
U. 516, 280 P. 1042. 
The Utah Statute of Limitations found at 78-
12-2 & 3, UCA 1953 - [For text of sections cited 
see appendices page 51] imposes a limitation upon 
both the state and its patentees in the bringing of an 
action to recover lands unless the claimant had been 
in possession or received the rents and profits of 
such land within 7 years from commencement of the 
action. 
It was admitted that appellants and their pre-
decessors in title had not been in the actual posses-
sion of the lands in question at any time and that 
they had never received any of the issues, rents or 
profits thereof. (R. 68, 69) 
The statutory bar would seem to be absolute 
were it not for the doctrine announced in the case 
of Van Wagoner vs. Whitmore, 58 Uta:h 418, 199 
P. 670, if that case is applicable to the instant situ-
ation. We have previously under Point I analyzed 
the Whitmore case in some detail and it is not our 
purpose to again belabor the court on the distinction 
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between the situation there confronting the court 
and the situation in this case. We believe it suffices 
to point out that because of the fact that the State 
of Utah had not received the consideration which 
Congress had intended it should receive for relin-
quishment of its interest in the school lands the court 
adopted the position that such lands constitute trust 
lands and the State could not have intended by the 
enactment of the law referred to above, 78-12-3. DCA 
1953, to deprive the people of the state of the bene-
fits which Congress intended they should receive. 
That reasoning has no application to the instant 
situation because the state has received all to which 
it is entitled. We believe the answer to the problem 
lies in recognition of the fact as urged under Point' 
I that the State is a nominal party in this action. 
We again refer the Court to the citation from Am-
erican Jurisprudence set out at pages 21 and 22 of 
this brief as an excellent statement of the law ap-
plicable to the facts in this case. 
To view this situation otherwise would give 
to the appellants a preferred situation which they 
would not have enjoyed had they complied with the 
formalities required and the patent been issued. Can 
it be then that by their own default they have in-
sured themselves of a position where after the lapse 
of more than forty years without the payment of 
taxes, or the taking of possession, they can deprive 
of title one who under claim of right has paid the 
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taxes, has taken possession and improved the land? 
We do not believe this is either law or equity. 
Appellants in their brief chose to ignore a fur-
ther grounds establishing the sufficiency of respon-
dents title to the lands in question. It will be re-
called by the court that the respondent claims under 
a deed acquired from Beaver County, which county 
in turn acquired its interest in the property through 
tax sale (R. 51, Exhibits 1, page 11 and 12, 15 and 
16; Exhibit 2, pages 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 & 30). We 
have previously referred the court to the Utah Code, 
Section 59-2-2, U.C.A~ 1953, which exists substan-
tially in its present form in the 1898 code and the 
1907 code, except for the provision that after final 
payment has been made, the contract of sale for the 
purpose of taxation should be considered as passing 
title to the purchaser or assignee. This provision was 
enacted by Chapter 113, Section 1 of the Laws of· 
Utah 1919. The respondent makes claim as the holder 
of a good and sufficient tax title from Beaver County 
and in the lower court upon motion duly made and 
by leave of the court, granted in open court, the 
respondent filed a reply (R. 70, 71) in which res-
pondent claimed the benefit of the statute of limi-
ta:tions, Title 78, Chapter 12, Section 7.1, 5.1, 5.2 
and 5.3 U.C.A. 1953 as enacted by the laws of Utah 
1951, Chapter 19, Section 1, et seq. ['The cited sec-
tions of the code are set forth in full in the appen-
dices page 52-53] . 
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The sections of the code referred to impose an 
absolute bar to the maintenance of an action tore- 1 
cover possession or title to real property or to inter-'.·· 
pose a defense as against one claiming under tax 1 
title unless the party so seeking to recover posses- i 
sion or title or interpose the defense was in fact 
possessed of the land within 4 years from the com- • 
mencement of the action or within one year from I 
the date of the enactment. 
This court in the case of Hansen vs. Hansen 3 ~ 
Utah 2nd 310, 283 P. 2nd 884~ has upheld the vali-
dity and constitutionality of these sections of 
the code. Since more than four years elapsed be-
tween the effective date of the statutes referred J 
to and the commencement of this action, respondent J 
claimed the benefit of the statute of limitations I 
and the lower court in its memorandum decision 
(R. 76) states: 
"That the respondent by virtue of its 
purchase of said lands from Beaver County 
became entitled to possession and use of said 
lands." 
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law 
( R. 102 through 107) the court made findings which 
verified the validity of the respondent's claim to 
the protection of the statutes referred to. No appeal · 
has been taken by the appellant from the findings 
of fact made and entered by the lower court. With 
respect to this matter appellants choose rather to 
direct their entire attention to the contention, which 
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they raise, that respondent can not acquire any 
rights prior to the issuance of patent. We submit 
that the rights acquired by the respondent from 
Beaver County were substantial rights, were recog-
nized by the court below as a part of its decision. 
We can not conceive of a more appropriate case in 
which to apply the provision of the statute above 
referred to than the instant case where the appel-
lants and their predecessors in title have permitted 
the lands in question to stand idle on the tax rolls of 
Beaver County for more than 40 years and yet now 
seek to come forward and assert title to the same. 
We believe a short analysis of the cases cited 
by appellants in support of their position on this 
Point 2 may be helpful to the court. 
We direct the courts attention to the quotation 
appearing in appellant's brief at page 16, taken 
from the case of Steele vs. Boley, 7 Utah 64, 24 P. 
755. 
"* * * We must hold that the District 
Court erred in admitting evidence of adverse 
possession by defendants prior to the issuing 
of the patent to the plaintiff* * *" 
Taken thus from the context one is given the 
impression that this case does indicate that there 
could be no adverse possession prior to issuance of 
patent. 
The case of Steele vs. Boley involved the ques-
tion of whether the State Statutes of Limitations 
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and adverse possession of lands for which the patent 
had not yet been issued out of the United States 
Government could result in the acquisition of an 
adverse title against both the Federal Government 
and its patentee. The Court at Page 755 of the 
Pacific report of the case says : 
"But since the former decision in this 
court, the Supreme Court of the United States 
had held that while the title to public land is 
still in the United States, no adverse posses-
sion of it can, under state statute of limita-
tions, confer a title which will prevail in an 
action of ejectment in the court of the United 
States against the legal title under a patent 
from the United States. Redfield vs. Parks, 
132 US 239, 10 Sup. Ct. 83. In that case the 
court says : "It cannot be conceded that state 
legislation can in that manner imperil the 
rights of the United States or overcome the 
general principle that it is not amenable to 
the Statute of Limitations or the doctrine of 
laches." 
When viewed in the light of what the court 
was actually considering it is seen at once that the 
quotation taken out of context and put in appellants 
brief has no significance at all in connection with 
the problem involved in this case. 
A similar misleading quotation is made by 
appellants from the Toltec Ranch case at page 16 
of appellants' brief. 
"But counsel for the appellant insist that 
the Statute of Limitations could only begin 
to run from the issuance of patent, and tha~ 
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therefore, the defense of adverse possession 
must fail. This position would be sound if 
the legal title to the land had remained in the 
United States until the patent was issued; 
but such was not the case." 
A different interpretation is derived when one 
considers that the facts in the case disclose that 
plaintiff was a grantee from the Central Pacific 
Railroad Company and that the Central Pacific Rail-
road Company received the lands by grant from the 
United States. On September 5, 1896, the Railroad 
received its patent from the government and on 
May 4, 1897 conveyed the land to plaintiff. The de-
fendent and intervener had occupied the land since 
1875 or 1876. The question was whether or not the 
adverse possession, which was substantially proved 
commencing long prior to the actual issuance of the 
patent, would cut off the interest of the grantee of 
the Railroad or whether such possession did not be-
come adverse until issuance of patent. The court 
said that the title passed long prior to issuance of 
patent and that the patent was merely evidence of 
compliance with the terms of the grant. The holding 
is thus exactly to the contrary of the position for 
which appellants cite the case. The court held that 
the statute of limitations had run and that the 
grantee of the patentee was barred. [For the full text 
of the portion of the opinion from which the excerpt 
quoted by Appellants was taken, see appendices 
page 54-55] . 
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This case, far from being hostile to the res-
pondents position and supporting the position of 
appellants for which it is cited, becomes in actuality 
authority for the respondents and holds that even 
in the case of United States Patents, adverse posses-
sion may commence in the State of Utah prior to the 
issuance of patent, against a claimant who possesses 
legal ti tie under grant. The parallel between that 
situation and the one in the instant case is close, 
and while the matter involves a United States Pa-
tent rather than State the principles applied in that 
case are applicable to the case at hand. 
We believe that since the appellants and 
their predecessors in title were the parties entitle4 
to possession under the Certificate of Sale issued b~ 
the State and enjoyed the rights as defined by the 
court in the cases above cited, the adverse posses-· 
sion of the respondents would, under the doctrine of 
the Toltec Ranch case, cut the appellants off. 
The same principles are again recognized in 
the Utah Copper Co. vs. Eck11ULn case cited by ap-
pellants. In that case the Supreme Court cites with 
approval the case of Boe vs. Arnold, an Oregon 
case, 102 P. 290, which case held that, 
"One claiming title to the land by ad-
verse possession for the statutory period as 
against all persons, but recognizing the su-
perior title of the government may assert such 
adverse possession as against any person 
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claiming to be the owner under a prior grant 
from the government." 
It should be remembered that the Utah Copper 
Co. vs. Eckman case 47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178, in-
volved an attempt to foreclose the interests of the 
United States Government in a mining claim which 
had not yet been paten ted. Since the only means by 
which acquisition of title to a mining claim is by 
patent from the United States Government, the 
holding of a mining claim adverse to the claimant 
prior to the issuance of the patent would obviously 
avail one nothing because until the requirements for 
issuance of patent had been met, the claimant had 
nothing. When viewed in this light, the quotation 
appearing at page 17 of the appellant's brief from 
the Eckman case, becomes understandable and is not 
in conflict with the holding of the lower court in the 
instant case. 
In view of the foregoing we respectfully submit 
that the decision of the lower court on this point is 
correct and should be sustained as in conformity 
with both law and equity. 
POINT III 
THE COURT WILL NOT LEND ITS AID IN A 
SUIT BASED ON A DEED ACQUIRED BY MALFEAS-
ANCE OF PUBLIC OFFICE. 
The Court erred in holding that a quiet title 
decree may be based on an official abuse of public 
trust and malfeasance of office. 
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We believe this point is presented to this court, 
as in the answer filed in the court below, solely for 
the purpose of confusing the issues. We submit that 
there are no facts before this court which substan-
tiate the unsupported allegation made in either the 
Fifth Defense of the answer or appellants' brief of 
malfeasance in public office by the Beaver Coun-
ty Commissioners in making sale of the lands 
in question to Minersville Land and Livestock in the 
year 1941. The respondent in the court below moved 
to strike the fifth defense of appellant's answer. 
( R. 50). By order dated the 15th day of Septem-
ber 1956, the court granted the motion to strike 
the fifth defense from the answer. (R. 66) No ap-
peal was ever taken from this order of the court. 
No error is assigned in this appeal based upon the 
court's order striking the fifth defense. Appellants 
entire presentation consists of nothing more or less 
than their own unsubstantiated statements attribut-
ing to these worthy men ulterior motives for the 
transaction which was publicly conducted, made a 
matter of public record and known about by virtually 
all of the residents of the area and which has never 
previously been subject to question from 1941 to the 
present. Appellants' brief n1akes no mention of the 
order of the court striking the Fifth Defense from 
the answer. Appellants argue as though the alleged 
misconduct were a proven fact and the lower court 
a co-conspirator to breach the public trust. 
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That the court was entirely justified in reject-
ing this scurrilous attack on reputable officials of 
the County becomes apparent when one realizes that 
the appellants must succeed, if at all in this action, 
on the strength of their own title. They cannot pre-
vail by pointing out a weakness, real or supposed 
in respondents title. 
"As frequently stated, the complainant's 
right to relief depends upon the strength of 
his own title, not upon the weakness· of the 
title of his opponent. Having failed to estab-
lish title in himself, he cannot complain of in-
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the 
court adjudged title to be in the defendant." 
44 Am. Jur. QUIETING TITLE, P. 69 Sec. 
83. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the 
case of Dick vs. Roraker 155 U.S. 404, 39 L. Ed. 
201, states the rule as follows: 
"'The rule in ejectment is that the plain-
tiff must recover on the strength of his own 
title and not on the weakness of the title of 
his adversary. A like rule obtains in an equi t-
able action to remove a cloud from a title, 
and title in the complainant is of the essence 
of the right to relief." 
We further submit that the court below was 
justified in its action in striking the fifth defense 
in that the facts alleged as the basis for the defense 
would constitute, even if proved, a collateral attack 
upon the actions of these public officials. 
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The actions of public officials are presumed, in 
the absence of proof, to the contrary to have been 
faithfully and properly performed. 
"In the absence of any proof to the con-
trary there is a presumption that public of-
ficers have properly discharged the duties of 
their office and have faithfully performed 
those matters with which they are charged. 
This presumption applies to Federal, State, 
County and municipal officers * * *" 43 Am. 
Jur. PUBLIC OFFICERS P. 254, Section 
511.. 
The officials not being parties to this action, 
would be powerless to defend themselves or to come 
in and show the justification for their acts. The 
actions of public officials are always subject to the 
public scrutiny, but if they are to be called to task 
is must be in a direct proceeding for the purpose, 
not by way of a side attack in a proceeding to which 
the official is not even a party. \-__ 
"* * * It is frequently held that an of-
ficer is a. necessary party to a suit where it 
is sought to pass on the validity of his acts. 
* * * " 43 Am. J ur. PUBLIC OFFICERS P. 
251-2 Sec. 507. 
Under the Utah law if the public official was 
to be called to account for his official conduct. The 
action would have to be commenced within six years 
from the date of the act complained of. See 78-12-24 
UCA 1953. Can it be permitted to the appellants to 
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sit idly by knowing of these acts committed by the 
County officials and let 14 years go by and then seek 
to raise them indirectly in a proceeding to which the 
officials are not even parties? We submit this would 
not only be inequitable, it is not the law. We believe 
this court would be justified in striking from the 
brief the appellants Point Three. Had the Fifth De-
fense of appellants been deemed pertinent by the 
court below, and the issues raised therein been sub-
jected to proof we submit that the facts proved 
would have cleared the actions of these commis-
sioners of wrongdoing. It is beneath the dignity 
of this court to permit the presentation of such 
an argument as that set forth in Point Three 
of the appellants brief based solely upon innuendo 
and the unsupported statements of the appellants' 
counsel, with its inherent implication of complicity 
by the lower court to accomplish an ulterior end. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO ORDER THE STATE TO ISSUE PATENT TO 
THE APPELLANTS AS PURCHASERS OF THE LAND 
FROM THE STATE BUT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO THE IS-
SUANCE OF PATENT. 
The Court ,erred in refusing to order the State 
to issue patent to appellants as purchasers of the 
land from the State. 
Since we believe we have established in the 
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argument under Points 1 and 2, the respondents 
title to the land in question, the narrow point here 
involved seems to be whether the State should as a 
matter of form issue patent to the appellants and 
then the court make and enter its decree quieting 
title against the appellants and recognizing the title 
in the respondents by adverse possession and by ac-
quisition of tax title. We believe that to issue the 
patent to the appellants after the appellants rights 
thereto, have been cut off by reason of the respon-
dents intervening adverse possession and claim under 
tax title would be an improper act and one which 
does not give credence to the legislative intent as 
expressed by the statutes relating to the taxation 
of lands acquired from the State on certificates of 
sale cited under our discussion of Point 1. 
There has been a recent manifestion of this 
legislative intent in the enactment in 1945 of 59-2-3 
UCA 1953 which provides that the interest of a pur-
chaser of state lands shall be assessed and the tax 
collected thereon shall be collected as taxes on per-
sonal property, and that if sold for taxes a certified 
copy of the tax sale when furnished to the land board 
shall act as an assignment of the interest of the 
original purchaser. [For full text see appendices 
page 55-56]. 
The legislature here recognizes a tax sale may 
cut off a purchaser's right to patent. In the in-
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stant case, we believe the notification of the State 
by letter of respondents counsel bearing date of 
April 21, 1955 and the conference therein referred 
to (R. 51 Land Board Records, P. 37), constitutes 
notice to the State Land Board of the rights of 
Minersville Land and Livestock as purchaser of the 
tax title from Beaver County. Certainly the joinder 
of the State as a party defendant to this action 
brought by respondents constitutes such notice. The 
action of the State in refusing to issue patent to the 
appellants as successors to the rights of the original 
certificate holder, in the light of the impending liti-
gation and the claims of the respondents seems en-
tirely appropriate. The Answer filed by the Attorney 
General on behalf of the State disclaiming any bene-
ficial interest in the State and re-affirming the 
State's intention to carry out its function imposed 
by law with respect to the issuance of patent upon 
determinina tion by the court of the party or parties 
entitled thereto seems an entirely proper manner 
to insure performance in conformity with the Rev-
enue Laws and Laws relating to issuance of pa-
tent by the State. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court below correctly decided the issues 
presented. The judgment of the Lower Court should 
be affirmed with costs to respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
:JOHN S. BOYDEN, 
ALLEN H. TmBALS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPENDIX 
Excerpt from Appellants' brief, Page 2 & 3: 
"The suit filed by plaintiff and respon-
dent was not an action of trespass, nor a pos-
sessory action in the nature of ejectment, 
nor a suit to have plaintiff declared to be the 
present owner of the state land Certificate 
No. 8515 as a successor in interest of Joseph 
Henshaw, nor a suit alleging any right in 
plaintiff to title and patent under the land 
laws of the state by rights of purchase or 
otherwise. It was a quiet title suit instituted 
against the state and the holders of the cer-
tificate claiming ownership of the lands and 
right to a patent under the statute of limi-
tations by reason of payment of taxes and 
of title (7 year statute) and for four years 
adverse possession for seven years under color 
under a tax title ( 4 year statute)." 
78-12-2 UCA 1953: 
Actions by the state: The state will not 
sue any person for or in respect to any real 
property, or the issues or profits thereof, by 
reason of the right of title of the state to the 
same, unless : 
(1) Such right or title shall have ac-
crued within seven years before any action 
or other proceeding for the same shall be 
commenced; or, 
(2) The state or those from whom it 
claims shall have received the rents and pro-
fits of such real property, or some part there-
of, within seven years. 
78-12-3 UCA 1953: 
Actions by paten tees or gran tees from 
state: No action can be brought for or in 
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respect to real property by any person clain 
ing under letters patent or a grant from th 
state, unless the same might have been con 
menced by the state as herein specified, j 
case such patent had not been issued or grar 
made. 
"78-12-7 .1 U CA 1953 as amended - I 
every action for the recovery or possef 
sion of real property or to quiet title to or d€ 
termine the owner thereof the person estat 
lishing a legal title to such property sha: 
be presumed to have been possessed therE 
of within the time required by law; an1 
the occupation of such property by an: 
other person shall be deemed to have bee1 
under and in subordination to the legal title 
unless it appears that such property has bee1 
held and possessed adversely to such lega 
title for seven years before the commence 
ment of such action. Provided, however, tha 
if in any action any party shall establisl 
prima facie evidence that he is the owner Qj 
any real property under a tax title held b~ 
him and his predecessors for four years prim 
to the commencement of such action and on~ 
year after the effectiYe date of this amend· 
ment he shall be presumed to be the owne1 
of such property by adYerse possession unles! 
it appears that the owner of the legal title 01 
his predecessor has actually occupied or beer 
in possession of such property under such 01 
that such tax title owner and his predecessor~ 
have failed to pay all the taxes levied or as-
sessed upon such property within such fow 
year period." 
"78-12-5.1 -No action for the recovel'J 
52 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of real property or for the possession thereof 
shall be n1ain tained, unless the plain tiff or 
his predecessor was seized or possessed of 
such property within seven years frorn the 
commencement of such action; provided, how-
ever, that with respect to actions or defenses 
brought or interposed for the recovery or pos-
session of or to quiet title or determine the 
ownership of real property against the holder 
of a tax title to such property, no such action 
or defense shall be commenced or interposed 
more than four years after the date of the 
tax deed, conveyance or transfer creating 
such tax title unless the person commencing 
or interposing such action or defense or his 
predecessor has actually occupied or been in 
possession of such property within four years 
prior to the commencement or interposition 
of such action or defense or within one year 
from the effective date of this amendment." 
"78-12-5.2 - No action or defense for 
the recovery or possession of real property 
or to quiet title or determine the ownership 
thereof shall be commenced or interposed 
against the holder of a tax title after the ex-
piration of four years from the date of the 
sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title 
to any county, or directly to any other pur-
chaser thereof at any public or private tax 
sale and after the expiration of one year from 
the date of this act. Provided, however, that 
this section shall not bar any action or de-
fense by the owner of the legal title to such 
property where he or his predecessor has ac-
tually occupied or been in actual possession 
of such property within four years from the 
commencement or interposition of such action 
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or defense. And provided further, that thi, 
section shall not bar any defense by a city o: 
town, to an action by the holder of a taJ 
title, to the effect that such city or town holdJ 
a lien against such property whieh is equa 
or superior to the claim of the holder of sue} 
tax title." 
"78-12-5.3 - The term 'arax Title" a1 
used in section 78-12-5.2 and section 59-10-6[ 
and the related amended sections 78-12-5, 78· 
12-7 and 78-12-12 means any title to rea: 
property, whether valid or not, which ha~ 
been derived through or is dependent upoiJ 
any sale, conveyance or transfer of such pro-
perty in the course of a statutory proceeding 
for the liquidation of any tax levied against 
such property whereby the property is re· 
lieved from a tax lien." 
Full text of quotation from Toltec Ranch Co. 
vs. Babcock: 
"* * * but such was not the case. The 
land in controversy constituted part of the 
lands granted by congress to the Central Pa-
cific Railroad Company. The original grant 
was made by act of July 1, 1862 ( 12 Stat. 
489) and the amount of the grant was en· 
larged by the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat 
356). The grant was one in praesenti, and 
vested the legal title to the land in the railroad 
company subject to some conditions relating 
to the construction of the line of the railroad 
and the identification of the lands. The lanru 
which passed by the grant became identified 
October 20, 1868, the date of the filing of the 
map of definite location in the office of th1 
Secretary of Interior. Tarpey vs. Madsen 1n 
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U.S. 215, 20 Sup. Ct. 849 44 L. Ed. 1042. 
Upon their identification, and the location and 
the construction of the road, the title vested 
in the grantee as of the date of the grant, and 
the patent thereafter issued by the govern-
ment was not essential to vest the legal right, 
but it constituted evidence that the conditions 
of the grant had been compiled with by the 
grantee, and to that extent relieved the grant 
from the possibility of forfeiture for failure 
to comply with these conditions. The grantee 
being thus vested with the legal title, had 
the right to enter upon the land, occupy, and 
use it after identification, the same as after 
the patent had been issued. * * * The railroad 
company having had, as we have seen the 
legal title to the land in dispute at least from 
time of filing of the map of definite location 
with the Secretary of the Interior, and having 
had the right to enter upon, occupy and use 
the land, there would seem to be neither rea-
son nor authority to hold that the statute of 
limitations did not run against the company 
and its grantee as well before as after the 
issuance of the patent, and this even though 
the intervener may have supposed her title 
was subordinate to that of the United States; 
for possession held in subordination to the 
title of the government may be adverse to an-
other claimant. Francoeur vs. Newhouse 14 
Sawy. 600 (C. C.) 43 Fed. 236; 9 Am. Eng. 
Enc. Law, 58; Hayes vs. Martin 45 Cal 559. 
From the foregoing considerations, and from 
a careful examination of the proof, we are 
of the opinion that the intervener is entitled 
to hold the land in controversy and the crops 
raised thereon, by adverse possession, and 
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that as against the plaintiff she has the abso-
1 u te title thereto. (Italics ours) 
59-2-3. DCA 1953-Collection of tax on 
interest of purchaser-Certificate of sale-
Effect of filed certificate.-Any tax levied on 
the interest of a purchaser of state lands be-
fore title passes to such purchaser or his as-
signee, shall be collected in the same manner 
as taxes on personal property and the said in-
terest shall be subject to sale for taxes in the 
same manner as personal property. 
Upon the sale of any interest, the officer 
making such sale shall issue a certificate of 
sale, and such certificate or certified copy 
thereof, upon being filed with the state land 
board, shall operate as an assignment of the 
interest of the original purchaser or his as-
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